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Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India
Oliver Heath1 & Louise Tillin2
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract Inefficient and corrupt institutions provide an incentive for citizens to focus
on short causal chains, which prize instant benefits from direct, clientelist exchanges
over the promise of uncertain and distant programmatic rewards. Drawing on a tightly
controlled comparison arising from the bifurcation of a state within the Indian federal
system into two units that have demonstrated marked differences in institutional
development post division, and a survey administered across the new state boundary,
we show that citizens are more responsive to small inducements in weak institutional
settings where the delivery of basic goods by the state is less certain, but that these
institutional effects weaken as the size of the inducement increases.
Keywords Vote buying . Clientelism . Institutional performance . India
Introduction
When do voters ‘sell their vote’ and how is their decision to do so influenced by the
institutional context? In this article, we examine how improved institutional perfor-
mance in public service delivery affects citizen responsiveness to clientelist appeals.
We argue that where institutions are inefficient and function badly, citizens have greater
incentive to prize the short-term benefits that clientelist exchanges provide than the
long-term—yet uncertain—goods that are promised by programmatic policies. Poor
institutional performance therefore makes the prospect of a bag of goodies in the hand
today more attractive than the promise of distributive public policy tomorrow. But in
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situations where institutional reforms make the delivery of basic goods by the state
more reliable, citizens may become less responsive to vote buying.
In developing our hypotheses, we build on two key insights from the literature. First,
citizens respond to clientelist appeals because they are risk averse, preferring direct,
instant clientelist benefits over indirect, programmatic policies promising uncertain and
distant rewards to voters (see, for example Desposato 2007; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt
and Kselman 2013; Scott 1977; Wantchekon 2003). Second, clientelist appeals have
diminishing marginal utility: thus, poor people value a handout more highly than do
wealthy people; hence, if one is going to hand out material inducements, one will target
the poor (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes et al. 2013).
Previous research has tended to examine both these factors from the perspective of
poverty and education. But—as we show—the institutional context can also have a
strong bearing on the nature of this calculus. If institutions do not function well, and are
leaky, then the probability of ever receiving the promised benefit of a programmatic
policy is extremely low. In this situation, rational voters will discount the future and the
prospect of short-term clientelist goods will be more attractive. We would therefore
expect citizens to be more responsive to vote buying in such a setting. However, when
institutions function better, voters can see the link between policy promises and policy
implementation and so will be less likely to sacrifice their preferred policy outcome for
a short-term pay-off.
In addition, the diminishing marginal utility of clientelist appeals has tended to be
regarded as a function of citizen income: as people become wealthier, they will value
less the fixed price of a good that they are offered. Or put another way, the greater the
value of the good voters are offered, the less difference there will be between whether
rich people and poor people are responsive to the inducement. We show that institu-
tional context can also influence the marginal utility of vote buying. When public
services function badly, people will sell their vote for relatively little, but as institutions
perform better the cost of vote buying also increases. This implies that the greater the
value of the good voters are offered, the less difference there will be between whether
people are prepared to sell their vote in well-performing institutional settings and badly
performing institutional settings. Therefore, we expect to see larger institutional effects
on small inducements than large inducements.
In order to test these propositions, we take advantage of a tightly controlled
comparison in central India made possible by the division of the state (federal sub-
unit) of Madhya Pradesh in 2000, leading to the formation of the new state of
Chhattisgarh. Given that a natural experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impos-
sible) research design to execute for our research question, this approach is arguably the
next best alternative. By carrying out a cross-border survey and studying villages on
either side of a newly created state border, we are able to exert a high degree of control
over factors commonly associated with clientelism, such as poverty, political compe-
tition, socioeconomic structure, ethnic and kinship relations, and administrative history.
Since bifurcation, however, political leaders in the two states have made different
decisions about how to work with the local bureaucracy to shape the performance of
institutions that are critical for the delivery of public services. Their different strategies
have led to substantial variation in the delivery of social welfare programmes, partic-
ularly those concerned with basic food provision and employment. Inhabitants living
on either side of the border are thus exposed to different institutional contexts. Those
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living on the Chhattisgarh side of the border have experienced relatively more efficient,
universal, and easy-to-access social welfare programmes compared to people living on
the Madhya Pradesh side of the border where important social programmes remain
(inefficiently) targeted, leaky, and subject to local political intermediation. Villages and
inhabitants on the immediate side of either border are similar in practically every other
way apart from these institutional settings.
In taking advantage of this tightly controlled comparison, we join a number of other
researchers (see, for example Laitin 1986; Miguel 2004; Miles and Rochefort 1991;
Posner 2004) who have also exploited the partitioning of ethnic groups by administra-
tive boundaries to study how similar social groups respond to different social and
political environments. We can thus explore how groups with similar socioeconomic
backgrounds respond to clientelist appeals in different institutional environments, while
holding constant the most important factors associated with the public responsiveness
to clientelism across the groups.
Institutional Performance and Clientelism
India is often regarded as a ‘patronage democracy’ (Chandra 2004). Vast amounts of
money continue to circulate during Indian elections. In the run-up to elections in the
state of Bihar in 2015, journalists reported that ‘almost 17 crore [$2.5million] in cash’
and ‘1.5 lakh [150,000] litres of liquor’ had been seized under the electoral code of
conduct in a state where ‘cash and liquor are commonly used…to influence voters’
(Pandey 2015). The Wall Street Journal asked during India’s 2014 General Elections,
‘The big question for some voters… isn’t who will win, it is how much candidates will
dole out in cash, alcohol and other goodies to bag their support’ (Mandhana and
Agarwal 2014). These reports reflect a widely held popular perception that vote buying
plays an important role in determining voter behaviour.
In this article, we focus on this material dimension of clientelism, rather than
the less tangible—although still important—longer-term relationships that are
also embedded within vote buying exchanges. Following Schaffer (2007, 5),
we define ‘vote buying’ as the offer of particularistic material goods (such as
cash, food, clothes, household items) to individuals or households at election
time in an attempt to influence election outcomes. Despite the prevalence of
clientelist exchanges of this type in many democracies around the world, we still
know comparatively little about why parties pursue this type of strategy and why
voters respond to them. The literature identifies several possible determinants of
clientelism. These include economic development and public responsiveness to
clientelist appeals (Wantchekon 2003; Brusco et al. 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 2012),
state institutions and politicians’ access to public resources (Hicken 2011), and
political competition and politicians’ incentives to make clientelist appeals
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Other explanations include the role of cultural
norms such as reciprocity (Auyero 2000; Putnam 1993), ethnicity (Chandra
2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), and political institutions such as regime
type, campaign finance regulations, electoral systems, and ballot design (Golden
2003; van de Walle 2003; Roniger 2004; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Brusco
et al. 2004; Hicken 2007).
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Although scholars have proposed a wide variety of different explanations for the
prevalence of clientelism, the causal mechanisms at work have been contested and
empirical evidence has been mixed. While some controversies have been resolved,
others remain. For example, whereas there is now widespread agreement in the
literature that economic (under-)development is an important reason for clientelism,
the relationship between institutional performance and clientelism is still a source of
lively debate. Although it is clear that institutional legacies are important, it is far less
clear how they are important and in what ways.
The performance and autonomy of bureaucracies may influence elite incentives to
pursue clientelist exchanges. Shefter (1977, 1993) argues that in administrative systems
where a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy precedes democratisation, the ability of
politicians to divert state resources towards clientelist strategies is greatly reduced.
Furthermore, he suggests that if political parties are incumbents and therefore have
access to state resources, they are more likely to rely on clientelism than ‘outsider’ or
challenger parties who are not in positions of power in the existing regime and are
therefore forced to rely on programmatic or ideological appeals to fight their way to
power (see also van de Walle (2003) on the importance for parties of winning
‘founding’ elections). Along similar lines, Huber and McCarty (2004) argue that where
bureaucratic capacity is lower, politicians will find it harder to achieve their policy
goals and will have greater incentives to politicise the bureaucracy, increasing the
prevalence of clientelism.
Keefer (2006) posits the alternative view that once parties win power, there may be
little to prevent them politicising the bureaucracy to turn it into a source of patronage.
Political interference with once autonomous bureaucracies is not uncommon (Hicken
2001; Baxter et al. 2002; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) thus
argue that whether or not politicians pursue clientelist strategies depends instead upon
their strategies for building political credibility rather than the prior quality of institu-
tions. They argue that it is costly for politicians to build a reputation for political
credibility via public policy commitments: ‘Politicians must expend resources to reach
voters with their promises, to allow voters to monitor the fulfilment of promises, and to
ensure that voters turn out on election day’ (ibid 372). Politicians can opt out of these
expenditures by relying on intermediaries (or brokers) who already have a ‘customary
trust relationship’ with some groups of voters.
Empirical studies have shown that there is substantial variation in the extent to
which political leaders across India rely primarily on clientelist strategies to mobilise
votes. Many leaders recognise the need to supplement traditional clientelist strategies
with programmatic activities or ‘post-clientelist’ strategies that are not implemented in a
particularistic or discretionary manner (Wilkinson 2007; Manor 2010; Wyatt 2013).
With a growing private sector and larger middle class, the electorate may be less
dependent on the state, while the growth of the mass media has also increased scrutiny
of corruption (Wilkinson 2007).
In this article, we build on these insights by examining the issues from a slightly
different perspective. Rather than examining how the performance of bureaucracies
influences elite incentives to pursue clientelist exchanges, or how elites politicise the
bureaucracy to turn it into a source of patronage, we examine how the performance of
bureaucratic institutions affects citizens’ responsiveness to clientelist appeals and how
elites can reform the bureaucracy to make it more effective and less corrupt. We do so
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with reference to the delivery of public services, and the delivery of subsidised food via
the Public Distribution System specifically. By institutional performance, we are
primarily concerned with the record of the bureaucracy in performing routine tasks of
administration that affect the delivery of government policies and programmes. By
institutions, we mean organisations within the state and federal bureaucracy and the
norms and practices shared among officials.1
Research Design
Clientelist practices may emerge in contexts of weak institutional capacity and may also
undermine institutional capacity. That is, clientelism may be both a cause and a
consequence of institutional performance. Indeed, a large body of research shows that
clientelism is at best inefficient and at worst corrupt, with clientelist systems exhibiting
lower primary school enrolment rates, less effective use of public resources, and more
corrupt business practices than programmatic systems (Keefer 2006, 2007; Hicken and
Simmons 2008; Singer 2009). Moreover, both the prevalence of clientelism and the
performance of institutions may be co-determined by historical legacies relating to the
development of the bureaucracy. This means that it is very difficult to examine the
relationship between institutional capacity and clientelism, and attempts to do so (e.g.
Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2009) have been criticised for failing to take into
account reciprocal causation (see Hicken 2011).
We address this problem by carrying out a carefully constructed comparison which
exploits the division of Madhya Pradesh into two states. Madhya Pradesh and Chhat-
tisgarh share many economic, developmental, political, and cultural similarities and
until 2000 were part of the same state. They are predominantly rural and Hindi
speaking, with large populations of ‘Scheduled Tribes’ or indigenous communities.
They have a common political history of Congress Party dominance, challenged in
recent decades by the ascendancy of the Hindu nationalist BJP which has consistently
won all state legislative assembly elections in both states since 2003. Both have two-
party systems and unlike other Indian states have not seen the emergence of strong
regional parties. Both states are characterised by high levels of poverty and under-
nutrition. Five years after their bifurcation, in both states almost 50% of the population
was classified as living below the poverty line compared to 37% at the all-India level
(Planning Commission 2012). Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the fact that
villages on the Madhya Pradesh side of the border are very similar to villages on the
Chhattisgarh side of the border—save for the administrative zone under which they fall.
India’s constitution gives the federal government the ability to divide or
change the boundaries of states within the federation on the basis of a simple
parliamentary majority. Unlike most other instances in which new states have
1 The bureaucratic agencies that are involved in the performance of a programme such as the Public
Distribution System operate at multiple levels: the local, state, and more distant federal levels. At the state
level, they may include the functioning of the Department of Food and Civil Supplies, Cooperatives
Department, State Civil Supplies Corporation, the Food Corporation of India, Warehousing Corporation of
India, and National Informatics Centre. The distribution of Below Poverty Line and ‘ration’ cards, which
determine eligibility for this programme and others, depends on the office of the District collector and
Panchayat secretary at village level, as well as oversight by elected members of local bodies.
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been created in India, the bifurcation of Madhya Pradesh did not respond to
strong popular mobilisation demanding statehood. The division of Madhya
Pradesh arose from inter-elite contestation, rather than pressure from below
(Tillin 2013). This is in contrast to the other two states which were created
elsewhere in India at the same time, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, where there had
been long-run social mobilisation for greater regional autonomy in the form of
statehood and where patterns of political competition have diverged from their
parent states since their bifurcation.
While the creation of the new state of Chhattisgarh was more top-down than
other instances of state creation, the redrawing of state boundaries was not entirely
random since the new state borders follow the line of earlier district boundaries. In
the area covered by Marwahi assembly constituency (see Fig. 1), the state border
followed the contour of the district boundary in the old colonial-era Central Prov-
inces and Berar province, and to the north the border followed district boundaries
that encompassed areas governed by earlier princely states. The process of bifurca-
tion was striking in that there was little contestation about which districts should be
included in Chhattisgarh. The region of Madhya Pradesh that became present-day
Chhattisgarh was regarded as a backwater of the parent state. It was poor and under-
developed, despite the presence of natural resources. Unlike the cases of Jharkhand
and Uttarakhand (and the more recent case of Telangana), there was no backlash
from the parent state against the proposed bifurcation and little sustained dispute as
to where the new state border should fall. In fact, the first resolution in favour of
creating the state was passed without any major opposition by the Madhya Pradesh
state assembly in 1994 (Tillin 2013, 153).
Fig. 1 Research site
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The districts sampled in our study, which all have substantial tribal popula-
tions, were mostly indirectly ruled by various princely states during the colonial
era, and thus bear many similarities to each other in terms of their longer-term
histories of administration. Moreover, the borders were not drawn to enhance the
political advantage of incumbent elites on either side, and the districts on either
side of the border remain nearly identical in terms of party competition and
electoral outcomes. Thus, the division of the two states was—unlike many other
instances of state creation in India—a largely top-down administrative reform
that did not reflect popular mobilisation or different patterns of electoral politics
on the ground. Populations living immediately adjacent to the state border were
divided by a new administrative boundary that they had not played a role in
demanding or constructing.
As Table 1 shows, at the point of bifurcation, the villages on either side of the state
border were very similar to each other in social and political terms, and in institutional
terms with respect to the provision of public services. While the proportion of Sched-
uled Tribes was higher in the Shahdol district of Madhya Pradesh in 2001 than in the
Chhattisgarh districts, the proportion of Scheduled Castes was higher on the
Table 1 Pre-bifurcation balance checks
Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh
Demographics
Literacy 52 49
Sex ratioa 959 956
In work 44 43
Scheduled tribes 25 44
Scheduled castes 16 7
Service delivery
Safe drinking water 98 100
Electricity for domestic purposes 56 52
Primary school 89 94
Secondary school 13 12
Primary health centre 15 10
Bus services 14 21
Paved approach road 34 33
Politics
Turnout 54% 49%
BJP 43% 44%
Congress 41% 36%
JD 5% 1%
BSP 4% 6%
aWomen per 1000 men. Demographic and Service Delivery data comes from district area profiles, Census of
India 2001. The districts are Shahdol in Madhya Pradesh, and Bilaspur and Koriya in Chhattisgarh. Political
data comes from 1998 Vidhan Sabha elections, Election Commission of India
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Chhattisgarh side.2 Over 40% of the population in the districts on either side of the
border come from these socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Politically, the
assembly segments on either side of the border were both characterised by competitive
contests between the BJP and Congress, with similar levels of voter turnout suggesting
little difference in civic participation. And institutionally, the proportion of villages with
access to education and health services, water and electricity, and transportation links
was very similar on either side of the border, reflecting the common administrative
history the two new states shared.
However, despite their common administrative histories and shared developmental
challenges, since bifurcation the political leadership of the two states has pursued
markedly different approaches to public administration, particularly with regard to
the delivery of welfare programmes. In Chhattisgarh, the state’s top political leadership
made the strategic decision to improve the efficiency of social transfer programmes, in
particular the Public Distribution System (PDS) through which subsidised food is
distributed, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(MGNREGS) through which rural households can demand up to 100 days of employ-
ment per year on public works. By contrast in Madhya Pradesh, no such strategic
decisions were made by the political leadership. Food subsidies, in particular, continued
to function as a major system of patronage dispersal.
Throughout India, the Public Distribution System has been known for high levels of
corruption. A Planning Commission survey in 2004 estimated that 58% of foodgrains
do not reach their intended beneficiaries (Saxena 2012). Common complaints about the
operation of the PDS relate to the sale of foodgrains on the black market, the
adulteration of the foodgrains sold through ‘fair price shops’, unaccountable local
shopkeepers who do not open at regular hours and frequently claim not to have
received supplies, and local bureaucratic corruption or inefficiency which frequently
excludes the poorest from possession of the requisite ‘ration card’ (see summary in
Pritchard et al. 2013, 110–1). For these reasons, the PDS has been the subject of
vigorous national debate and reform efforts. India’s Supreme Court issued a series of
legal orders from 2001 onwards seeking enforcement of the ‘right to food’. These
orders placed a legal requirement on all states to improve the performance of the Public
Distribution System. More recently, after a lengthy political debate, a new National
Food Security Act was passed in late 2013 providing statutory backing to a ‘right to
food’, and stipulating new requirements for food subsidies and their delivery. Yet, states
have demonstrated substantial variation in how they have approached edicts to improve
the efficiency of the Public Distribution System.3
Since 2003, the state government in Chhattisgarh has embarked on the most far-
reaching reforms to the PDS of any state in India. At the heart of these reforms was an
overhaul of the delivery of subsidised food through a combination of reforms to
delivery mechanisms, computerisation, and an expansion of the beneficiary pool to
transform a programme that had been targeted towards the ‘below poverty line’ (BPL)
2 Census of India 2001. Because the assembly constituencies surveyed cross more than one sub-district, it is
not possible to provide census data at the level of the assembly constituency. The data here thus refers to
districts that are larger than the assembly constituencies surveyed. In the villages we surveyed within assembly
constituencies, as shown below (Table 2), the Scheduled Tribe population was in fact larger on the Chhattis-
garh side of the border.
3 Fieldwork for this study was conducted before the National Food Security Act came into effect in the states.
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population into a quasi-universal programme. It brought ‘fair price shops’ and the
transportation companies which move foodgrains between field, rice mill, warehouse,
and shop, back into public ownership. These decisions triggered over 400 court cases,
and required the state’s top political leadership to withstand pressure from private
traders, an important constituency for the incumbent BJP. Licences to run fair price
shops were then granted to local elected councils, self-help groups, and cooperative
societies in an attempt to improve their accountability to local communities. Subse-
quently, the Chief Minister, Raman Singh, decided to substantially expand the propor-
tion of the population with access to heavily subsidised food by launching a new ‘Chief
Minister’s Food Security Scheme’ which granted 35 kg of rice at just 2 rupees per
kilogramme to poor families, and at 1 rupee per kilogramme to the poorest. Simulta-
neously, senior civil servants were empowered to undertake efficiency reforms through
computerisation and enhanced transparency mechanisms, including the use of GPS
tracking of trucks moving foodgrains, sending SMS messages to local villagers to
inform them of the date new foodgrains would be delivered to their local shop, and
using a centralised computerised database to reissue ‘ration cards’.4
The reforms have had a dramatic impact on preventing leakages of foodgrains and
ensuring foodgrains reach the final mile to the fair price shop, as well as ensuring that
access to ration cards is not dependent on the discretion of local officials (see also
Patnaik 2010; Puri 2012). By increasing transparency and reducing corruption, they
have changed the way that these welfare programmes are delivered in Chhattisgarh
and—as our survey results demonstrate—have had a pronounced impact on the
delivery of, and satisfaction with, the operation of the Public Distribution System
specifically. Chhattisgarh is also considered to be one of the more effective states at
implementing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,
the largest social protection programme introduced in India in the last decade (Dreze
and Khera 2014).
By contrast, in Madhya Pradesh, access to the same schemes is much more
unreliable and bureaucratic corruption continues to play a critical role in determining
access. The Public Distribution System in particular is notoriously ‘leaky’, foodgrains
are siphoned off at various stages of the system, and the poor have extremely unreliable
access, compounded by the fact they frequently do not possess the requisite ration card
to secure their entitlements in the first place. While the state government also attempted
to initiate reforms to the Public Distribution System, the reform process was more
confused and did not receive clear direction from the political leadership. Reforms in
Madhya Pradesh focused more on the question of dealing with ‘inclusion’ errors—with
people who should not have Below Poverty Line ration cards but do—rather than with
‘exclusion errors’. The thrust was largely technocratic with a private consortium hired,
on the basis of a contract that was veiled in secrecy, to create a biometric ration card
database which was intended to be linked to a system of food coupons in the future. At
the time of our survey in late 2013, there had been very little attempt to improve
transparency or accountability, and the leadership necessary to overcome local political
and bureaucratic resistance to reform was not evident. Bureaucratic malpractice was
widespread. Local villagers frequently had to pay bribes to get a ration card, foodgrains
4 The reform process is analysed in greater depth in Tillin et al. (2015) drawing on interviews with politicians,
officials, NGO staff, and other local informants in both states.
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were often mixed with impurities, and the poorest were often denied the correct level of
entitlement—as the survey evidence we present below demonstrates. This means that
the PDS remained a vehicle for patronage, captured by vested interests, rather than for
the effective delivery of foodgrains to the food insecure.
It is worth emphasising here that the differences between the two states are of degree
and not absolute. Patron-client relations continue to exist in Chhattisgarh but have been
supplemented by more successful instances of programmatic policy delivery. Equally,
Madhya Pradesh is far from the most feckless of state governments (Jenkins and Manor
2015). But there are stark differences in outcomes in terms of the performance of key
areas of social policy to do with food and employment. According to data collected as
part of the ‘PEEP survey’ by Dreze and Khera (2014), access to the PDS scheme
among eligible recipients is much higher in Chhattisgarh than it is in Madhya Pradesh
(99 vs 49%) and the average number of days worked per household registered on the
MGNREGS is much higher in Chhattisgarh than in Madhya Pradesh (34 vs 8).
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explain why the two states
have pursued such different strategies, one reason may be to do with electoral strategy
and the ways in which the respective BJP leaders have sought to achieve what Keefer
and Vlaicu (2008) term ‘political credibility’, particularly among the rural poor. The
expansion, and improved operation, of the PDS has been central to the election
campaigns run by Chief Minister Raman Singh in Chhattisgarh. By contrast, the Chief
Minister of Madhya Pradesh Shivraj Singh Chauhan has focused more on the projec-
tion of a pro-farmer administration that builds on his rustic background and has seen
Madhya Pradesh become one of the leading states for wheat procurement
(Krishnamurthy 2012; Tillin et al. 2015). While any explanation for why the political
leaders adopted such different strategies must be treated as somewhat speculative, the
crucial point is that under these leaders the two states diverged in terms of their
institutional performance which had a clear impact on service delivery.
Thus, despite sharing a common culture, history, and level of economic develop-
ment, the contemporary approach to service delivery is strikingly different between the
two states. The differences in political and administrative strategies across the two
neighbouring states, which until their bifurcation were part of the same administrative
structure, provide an almost unique set of conditions to examine the impact of different
institutional contexts on voter responsiveness to clientelism. Importantly, we can be
confident that the variation in the delivery of public services across the states is not
endogenous to local electoral or socioeconomic factors but rather is a consequence of
the different reform strategies adopted by political leaders. In other words, it is not an
underlying shift in voter responsiveness to clientelism that has pushed one state in a
more programmatic direction in some areas of government activity, but rather a
strategic decision by the political leadership in Chhattisgarh to make the public delivery
of welfare programmes work more successfully.
Data Description
In order to examine the impact of these different institutional contexts on citizen
responsiveness to clientelist appeals, we administered a survey in 40 villages on either
side of the new state border: 20 in Madhya Pradesh (in the assembly constituencies of
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Anuppur and Kotma) and 20 in Chhattisgarh (in the assembly constituencies of
Marwahi and Manendragarh). Their location is shown in Fig. 1. We purposively
selected the two state legislative assembly constituencies on either side of the border
matching the incumbency status of each, so that we had both a BJP- and Congress-held
constituency in each state. Within each constituency, we randomly selected 10 villages,
and in each village, we randomly selected 12 people from the electoral rolls. The
surveys were completed during the election season of November–December 2013
during which new state legislative assemblies were elected simultaneously in both
states. The surveys were conducted after voting had taken place but before the results
were announced so that participants would be thinking about the conduct of the recent
elections but not influenced by their outcomes.
Table 2 presents a balance check on factors that are theoretically thought to be
related to vote buying. By far and away, the two most important factors that have been
identified in the literature are wealth and education. Poor people and poorly educated
people are thought to be more willing to sell their vote. As the table shows, our two
groups are well balanced, and selected inhabitants on either side of the border are
statistically indistinguishable on these covariates. Moreover, what differences there are
work against our key hypothesis as respondents on the Madhya Pradesh side of the
border are slightly better educated and slightly better off. Other possible confounds are
cultural norms (Auyero 2000) and ethnicity (Chandra 2004). Culturally, the two groups
are very similar: the villages on either side of the border are in deep forested areas.
Inhabitants are predominantly Hindus with large Scheduled Tribe populations. Despite
these similarities, we should note that there are more Scheduled Tribes, specifically
from the Gond community, on the Chhattisgarh side of the border. However, if
anything, we might expect Scheduled Tribes to be more likely to respond to clientelist
appeals as they are one of the most economically deprived ethnic groups in India, so
this lack of balance works against our key hypothesis.
Lastly, institutional factors such as regime type, electoral systems, or ballot design
(Golden 2003) and political competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) are often
thought to be related to clientelism. Institutional factors are obviously the same for
both groups since all Indian states follow the same electoral systems. In addition, the
Table 2 Balance tests on covariates
Chhattisgarh MP T test (diff. of means P value
Median HH income per month Rs3000 Rs3000
Mean HH income per month Rs9141 Rs11551 1.55 0.121
Literacy rate 62 68 1.566 0.118
Female 49 48 0.136 0.892
Mean age 37 40 2.586 0.010
Hindu 86 94 2.90 0.003
ST 48 22 6.21 < 0.0005
Gond 37 16 5.33 < 0.0005
Village 43 43 0.132 0.895
N 239 240
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structure of political competition is also the same: the BJP are the incumbent state
government in both states; the principal party competition is between the Congress and
BJP in each of the selected constituencies; and there was an incumbent MLA (Member
of the Legislative Assembly) from both the Congress and BJP on each side of the
border.
Given that a natural experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impossible) research
design to execute for our research question, our data on the history of state formation,
public service reform, and balance tests on theoretically relevant covariates give us
confidence that our two sample groups do provide valid counterfactual groups. That
said, in order to improve our causal inferences, we first employ regression analysis to
control for any differences that do exist between our two groups, and second, we turn to
semiparametric matching methods to balance covariates to mitigate against possible
confounders (Ho et al. 2007).
Institutional Performance
To gather data on the institutional context, we asked a range of questions designed to
measure how people access and evaluate a range of different public services on the
ground. As already mentioned, the areas of public service delivery that have undergone
the most extensive process of reform in Chhattisgarh are concerned with food and
employment. If these institutional reforms have been implemented effectively on the
ground, then we should anticipate that evaluations of these public services will
markedly differ between the two states. By contrast, those services which have not
been reformed—and so share the same institutional legacy—should function—and be
evaluated—in a similar way.
From Table 3, we can see that by far and away the biggest differences between
the states are on evaluations of food (PDS) and employment (MGNREGS). In both
cases, the services are evaluated far more positively in Chhattisgarh than they are in
Madhya Pradesh. This indicates that the reform process has shaped the ways in
Table 3 Evaluations of public services
Chhattisgarh MP Difference of means (T test) p value
Roads 1.54 1.77 3.00 0.002
Health 1.81 1.72 1.22 0.223
Electricity 1.54 1.50 0.04 0.621
Water 1.99 1.92 0.86 0.389
Law and order 1.79 1.77 0.31 0.755
Education 1.39 1.52 1.91 0.056
Food (PDS) 1.14 1.77 9.49 < 0.0005
Employment (MGNREGS) 1.76 2.15 4.87 < 0.0005
N 231 214
Now, thinking about how things have changed over the last 5 years. Please tell me whether you think each of
the following have got better, stayed the same, or got worse? (where 1 = got better; 2 = stayed the same;
3 = got worse)
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which people experience and evaluate the services on the ground. By contrast, those
services which have not been subject to major reform are evaluated in a very similar
way across the two states. There are not any significant differences between our two
groups on evaluations of health, education, electricity, water, or law and order. The
only exception is for roads, where evaluations do differ significantly between the
two states, although the magnitude of the difference (0.23 points) is substantially
less than the mean difference for evaluations of the PDS, which is nearly three times
greater at 0.63 points.
To get a deeper understanding about why these performance evaluations differ
between the two groups, we asked a series of follow-up questions specifically about
the PDS and MGNREG schemes (Table 4). The first thing to notice is that despite
similar levels of poverty between the two groups, access to ration cards—and crucially
access to the BPL ration cards—is much lower on the MP side of the border. Whereas
79% of inhabitants on the Chhattisgarh side had a BPL card, just 34% on the MP side
did so. Moreover, those people who did possess a BPL card in MP were not dispro-
portionately found among the most needy, and in fact possession of a BPL card was
somewhat higher among the better off than it was among the extreme poor. In follow-
up interviews, we asked inhabitants why they did not have a ration card (if they did not
have one) and we were frequently told that it was because they had not paid a bribe to
the local bureaucrat. One popular refrain we heard in the villages in MP was that ‘here
the rich people have ration cards but the poor people don’t’. Corruption in the local
bureaucracy was seen to be rife and a major obstacle to the successful implementation
of policies. Others told us that although the Chief Minister in MP had lots of good
initiatives, these policies never worked well on the ground. This is borne out by our
survey evidence which shows that access to the PDS is much higher on the Chhattis-
garh side of the border than on the MP side, as is satisfaction with how well the scheme
works.
These results are reassuring for the validity of our comparison. We can be confident
that the different institutional environments are a consequence of specific reforms to
service delivery that were carried out by the political leadership in Chhattisgarh on the
PDS (and to a lesser extent MGNREGS), rather than more general differences between
administrative zones and local bureaucracies which may be related to historical legacies
from before the bifurcation of the state.
Table 4 Access to public services and evaluations
Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh T test p
Possession of ration card 94 81 4.52 < 0.0005
Possession of BPL card 79 34 11.10 < 0.0005
Recipient of PDS 92 46 12.58 < 0.0005
Recipient of MGNREGA 44 28 3.50 < 0.0005
Satisfaction with PDS 1.54 3.03 12.48 < 0.0005
Final row, figures show responses to question: ‘All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied would you say you are
with the way in which the PDS runs nowadays?’ (1 = very satisfied; 2 = quite satisfied; 3 = neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied; 4 = quite dissatisfied; 5 = very dissatisfied)
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Institutional Performance and Responsiveness to Clientelism
Having established the broad equivalence of our two groups on all theoretically
important confounds, and described the process of top-down reform which has led to
very different institutional environments, we now turn to examining the impact of the
institutional context on voters’ willingness to vote in return for particularistic material
goods. To this end, we asked respondents in our survey about a number of hypothetical
vote buying situations. We carried out a split sample survey experiment where the party
was randomised so that half of the sample was asked about a BJP party worker and half
the sample was asked about a Congress party worker. We piloted various different
versions of the questionnaire to see how respondents reacted to different phrasings of
the question. Given that clientelism is such a pervasive feature of Indian politics, and
that vote buying was discussed quite openly by inhabitants of the villages, we decided
to ask a simple and direct question that was easily understood. We asked four variations
of the question, in which the value of the hypothetical inducement varied from very
small (vegetables) to very large (a government job).
Now, I’d like you to imagine that during the recent election campaign, a party
worker from the Congress/BJP gave you money that would allow you to buy
vegetables for your family for a week. Would you vote for their party?
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped to pay the expenses for medical
treatment for someone in your family? Would you vote for their party?
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped get your house a new water
pump? Would you vote for their party?
And what if someone from Congress/BJP helped to get a member of your family
a government job after the election? Would you vote for their party?
The first thing to note is that respondents had a clear ordering of the value of the
inducements. People were most responsive to large inducements and least responsive to
small inducements. As we would expect, the provision of a job was the most powerful
inducement to vote for a party, with nearly 60% of respondents reporting that they
would vote for the party providing the material favour. The provision of a water pump
was valued slightly more highly (26%) than medicine (18%). The provision of vege-
tables was valued somewhat less, but even in return for a relatively minor inducement,
around one in ten people still said that they would vote for the party who provided the
material favour. These findings show that people living in the context of rural poverty,
unemployment, and low rates of literacy are highly responsive to clientelist appeals.
In order to test the impact of the institutional context on voters’ responsiveness to
material inducements, we run a series of logistic regression models that also control for
individual-level attributes. In particular, it is well known that poor and uneducated
voters are most receptive to clientelist appeals, but does the institutional context also
matter when we take into account these individual-level attributes?
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for the most theoretically important covari-
ates of vote selling. In each model, the dependent variable is whether someone would
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vote for a party in return for the named inducement on offer (1 = Yes; 0 = No). The
independent variables are institutional context (where 1 = Chhattisgarh side of the
border; 0 = MP side of the border); poverty (where 1 = above poverty line; 0 = below
poverty line, and poverty line is set at a family living on less than £1 per day);
education (where 1 = above primary education; 0 = primary or below); caste (which
captures the main ethnic groups living in the locality and distinguishes between Upper
Castes, OBC (Other Backward Classes), SC (Scheduled Castes or former untouch-
ables), ST (Scheduled Tribes or ‘indigenous’ population) and others); and co-partisan-
ship. Our split sample survey experiment randomised the party offering the induce-
ment. In a separate question, we asked respondents about their own party affiliation.
The variable for co-partisanship links these two questions together (where 1 = party
offering the inducement matches the voter’s party affiliation and 0 = it does not match).
In line with prior theory, we can see that poverty and education influence whether or
not people respond to clientelist appeals. Across all models, the variables are correctly
signed. People living above the poverty line and people with some education above
primary are less responsive to clientelist appeals (particularly in the case when the size
of the inducement is very small). In line with prior theory, we also observe evidence
consistent with the diminishing marginal utility of such inducements. The magnitude of
the coefficients for poverty and education is smaller for large inducements (and do not
achieve significance) than they are for small inducements (which are significant),
indicating that the greater the value of the good voters are offered, the less difference
there is between whether richer people and poorer people are responsive to the
inducement. We can also see that there are some ethnic differences—and Scheduled
Tribes—one of the most deprived groups in India—are more responsive to clientelist
appeals than the other castes. This finding is consistent across the models.
Table 5 Responsiveness to inducements, logistic regression
Model 1: vegetables Model 2: medical Model 3: water pump Model 4: job
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Institutional context 1.232*** 0.410 − 0.009 0.269 0.041 0.239 − 0.090 0.211
Poverty (below = Ref)
Above poverty line − 0.955* 0.496 − 0.506 0.310 − 0.372 0.268 − 0.102 0.224
DK 0.064 0.485 0.127 0.330 0.404 0.297 − 0.093 0.298
Education − 0.900* 0.477 − 0.672** 0.301 − 0.435* 0.257 − 0.504** 0.220
Caste (upper = Ref)
OBC 1.052 0.811 0.630 0.502 0.659 0.407 0.701** 0.289
SC 1.058 0.911 0.825 0.578 0.626 0.494 0.497 0.376
ST 1.612** 0.806 1.147** 0.499 1.266*** 0.411 1.120*** 0.316
Other 1.394 1.067 1.112* 0.627 0.812 0.548 − 0.118 0.428
Co-partisanship 0.690* 0.368 0.678*** 0.258 0.458** 0.232 0.406* 0.212
Constant − 1.231*** 0.410 − 2.174*** 0.691 − 1.864*** 0.232 − 0.013 0.485
LR chi2 (9) 33.10*** 35.07*** 39.01 41.93***
N = 479
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Interestingly, we also see strong effects with respect to partisanship. Across each of
the models, voters are more responsive to inducements that come from co-partisans,
though once again the magnitude of the coefficient is greater for small inducements
than it is for larger inducements. When the effect of co-partisanship is large, then the
inducement to vote has a stronger effect on co-partisans than it does on non-supporters,
meaning that the inducement has a relatively stronger impact on mobilisation than
conversion. By contrast, when the effect of co-partisanship is small, then the induce-
ment is able to both mobilise and convert equally. This implies that small inducements
are more effective at mobilisation than conversion, and that parties may get more bang
for their buck by targeting supporters with small inducements and ‘buying turnout’
(Nichter 2008) rather than offering these inducements to swing voters or partisans of
other parties.
However, even controlling for all these factors, there are significant differences
between the two institutional groups in terms of how responsive people are to the
different types of inducement. In the context of poor institutional performance on the
MP side of the border, respondents are significantly more responsive to small induce-
ments than they are in the well-performing institutional context on the Chhattisgarh
side. However, as the size of the inducement increases, the difference between the two
groups decreases to non-significant levels. When the inducement is a water pump or
medicine, we do not see any significant institutional effects. Both of these goods are
quite highly valued goods. Most of the villages on both sides of the border only had a
limited water supply, and during fieldwork people frequently raised healthcare and
medical expenses as a major source of anxiety (see also Krishna 2011). Consistent with
our theory then, we observe relatively larger institutional effects on small inducements
than on medium and large inducements, which suggests that the institutional context
can influence the marginal utility of vote buying.
We can get a clearer idea of the magnitude of these effects by calculating the
predicted probabilities for whether a person from the Scheduled Tribe community,
living below the poverty line with no educational qualifications, would vote for a party
in return for the named inducement on offer, according to which side of the border they
live (Table 6). For this group of voters, the predicted probability of responding to the
food inducement is 0.26 in the context of poor institutional performance on the MP side
of the border but just 0.09 in the well-performing institutional context on the Chhat-
tisgarh side. This represents a sizeable difference. Moreover, the average effect of
institutional context (when holding all other variables at their mean) is about 9
percentage points.
Propensity Score Matching
In order to strengthen our inferences, we pre-process the data with a ‘matching’
procedure (e.g. Dunning 2008; Ho et al. 2007). Under this procedure, the effect of
being exposed to different institutional contexts is more accurately measured by
comparing the attitudes and behaviours of survey respondents who are similar to one
another, save the fact that one was exposed to a better-performing public service and
the other was not. In other words, the idea is that the researcher imposes some degree of
‘experimental’ control on what is observational data (Klofstad et al. 2013). By
St Comp Int Dev
comparing the attitudes and behaviours of similar individuals who were and were not
exposed to a well-performing public services, we can be more confident that any
observed differences in attitudes and behaviours between these groups are unrelated
to the factors that the respondents were matched on (and, as such, are a consequence of
being exposed to a well-performing public services instead of some confounding
factor).
In seminal work, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed propensity score matching
as a method to reduce the bias in the estimation of ‘treatment’ effects with observational
data sets. Matching methods differ in the way matched cases between the study groups
are defined (Ho et al. 2007). Inverse probability weighting with regression adjustment
(IPWRA) estimators model both the outcome and the selection, which means that the
estimate of the institutional effect will be unbiased if either the selection model or the
outcome model is mis-specified. It is important to note that matching is less precise
than a controlled experiment because the procedure does not account for unobserved
differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to different institu-
tional contexts (Sekhon 2009). However, since unobserved differences between indi-
viduals who were and were not exposed to different institutional contexts are likely to
correlate with observed differences, they are accounted for by proxy in the matching
procedure (Stuart and Green 2008). To this end, an extensive set of covariates were
used in the matching procedure, increasing the likelihood that any meaningful covar-
iates of responsiveness to clientelism are accounted for in the analysis. Each of the
covariates reported in Table 5 were included in the matching procedure. Importantly,
we also included whether respondents had access to the PDS scheme (reported in
Table 4) since we wanted to get an estimate of the institutional context, regardless of
whether households across the two units had access to food benefits.
To summarise the causal effect of institutional context, we can estimate the average
treatment effect (ATE). Table 7 shows the ATE of institutional context on each of the
inducements. Once again, we can see that the main findings hold up. The effect of
being exposed to the better-performing institutional context of Chhattisgarh signifi-
cantly reduces voters’ responsiveness to low-value inducements. The ATE is just under
6 percentage points. This is somewhat lower than the naïve estimate from the logistic
regression models, of about 9 percentage points. However, once again, we do not find
evidence that the institutional context influences voters’ responsiveness to higher-value
inducements which may be standing in for public goods and services that are in scarcer
supply in both states.
Table 6 Responsiveness to inducements: predicted probabilities
Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh
Vegetables 9 26
Medicine 29 30
Water pump 38 40
Job 75 74
N 239 240
Predicted probabilities for an ST living below the poverty line, with no education
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Conclusion
When do voters ‘sell their vote’? Answers to this simple question have long puzzled
scholars of comparative politics. Although a wide range of individual-level factors to
do with income and education have been proposed, up until now there has been
relatively little attention on how the calculus of voters is influenced by the institutional
context and the delivery of public services. Part of the reason for this is that the vast
majority of studies on clientelism have been based on single country case studies.
Comparative studies have been few, and those which do exist have tended to focus on
the behaviour of clientelist parties rather than the responsiveness of voters.
In this study, we have attempted to overcome these difficulties by drawing on a
carefully constructed comparison made possible by the division of Madhya Pradesh
into two separate states which have pursued very different processes of public service
reform. This allows us to examine two very different institutional contexts which share
many social, economic, and political characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first
study that has managed to examine how both individual-level factors and institutional
factors jointly shape whether or not people respond to clientelist appeals.
At the individual level, our results are supportive of current theories of vote buying
which emphasise the importance of poverty and education. In addition, we show that
mobilisation effects are greater than conversion effects, and that small inducements
have a greater impact on mobilisation that conversion. However, we also show that
above and beyond these individual-level factors, the institutional context matters. We
show that institutional context can influence the marginal utility of vote buying. When
public services function badly, people are prepared to sell their vote for relatively little,
but as services perform better, the cost of vote buying also increases. Or put another
way, the greater the value of the good voters are offered, the less difference we observe
between whether people are prepared to sell their vote in well-performing institutional
settings and badly performing institutional settings. This suggests a threshold effect.
When institutions do not function well, even small inducements can have a sizeable
effect on vote choice. However, in better-performing institutional contexts where basic
services are better provided, such minor inducements are less likely to be successful at
buying votes. Thus, as institutions perform better, the cost of vote buying also
increases.
The central implications of these findings are that citizens respond to clientelist
appeals because they are risk averse, relying on short causal chains that prize direct,
Table 7 Average treatment effect, inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment
Coeff. Robust std. err.
Vegetables − 0.055** 0.022
Medicine 0.041 0.038
Water pump 0.045 0.041
Job 0.017 0.057
N = 479
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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instant clientelist benefits over indirect, programmatic linkages promising uncertain and
distant rewards to voters. Although it is well known that poverty and education matter
in this regard, our findings show that institutional context also matters. If institutions do
not function well, and are leaky, then the probability of ever receiving the promised
benefit of a programmatic policy is extremely low. In this situation, rational voters will
discount the future and the appeal of short term clientelist goods will be more attractive.
However, when institutions function well, even in a limited way, voters can see the link
between policy promises and policy implementation and so will be less likely to
sacrifice their preferred policy outcome for a short-term pay-off. Poor institutional
performance therefore makes the prospect of direct personal transfers today more
attractive than the promise of redistributive public policy tomorrow.
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